Exploring sex differences in attitudes towards the descriptive and substantive representation of women by Allen, Peter & Cutts, David
        
Citation for published version:
Allen, P & Cutts, D 2016, 'Exploring sex differences in attitudes towards the descriptive and substantive
representation of women', British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 912-929.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148116668079
DOI:
10.1177/1369148116668079
Publication date:
2016
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
Peter Allen, David Cutts, Exploring sex differences in attitudes towards the descriptive and substantive
representation of women,International Relations, 18(4), pp. 912-929. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Reprinted
by permission of SAGE Publications.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
Exploring Sex Differences in Attitudes Towards the Descriptive and Substantive 
Representation of Women 
 
Forthcoming in the British Journal of Politics and International Relations 
Final accepted version – July 2016 
 
Peter Allen – Queen Mary University of London, p.allen@qmul.ac.uk 
David Cutts – University of Bath, d.j.cutts@bath.ac.uk  
 
Academic discussions about the political (under-)representation of women tend to focus on 
descriptive or substantive representation – that is, the numbers of women present in politics 
or the representation of so-called ‘women’s interests’ in politics. As such, arguments in 
favour of increases in women’s representation tend to invoke either or both of these ideas. 
Many, for example, argue that an increase in the descriptive representation of women (DRW) 
may result in an equivalent, or related, increased in the substantive representation of women 
(SRW) (Pitkin 1973; Lovenduski 2005; Mackay 2008), although the intricacies of what this 
may actually consist of are contested (Celis et al. 2008). Alternatively, the argument from 
justice articulates that a descriptive increase is desirable regardless of any resultant impact on 
substantive representation (Phillips 1995). Similarly, other arguments in favour of increased 
descriptive representation claim that such an increase will positively affect women, and other 
under-represented groups, in a symbolic way (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 2012). As such, 
there are arguments that focus on substantive political outcomes as a result of any increase in 
the number of women in political institutions, and those that do not. 
 
Despite this extensive literature, including multiple pieces of research focused on levels of 
public support for different measures designed to increase the number of women in politics, 
or the wider impact of these, we understand little of the public’s reasons for supporting such 
an increase (Alexander 2012; Broockman 2014; Clayton 2014). In this paper, we seek to 
redress this imbalance in the literature. Where public support for an increase in the number of 
women in politics exists, we look to find out whether it is driven by the anticipated gains in 
substantive representation it will bring about, or do the public instead support an increase for 
other reasons, without primary regard for any subsequent policy outcomes that can be 
considered as better representing ‘women’s interests’. 
 
In this paper we use data from the 2015 Northern Ireland General Election Survey to unpack 
public opinion on women’s political representation for the first time in the UK literature. We 
distinguish between those who support increases in descriptive representation and believe 
that women are better at representing women’s interests than men (a DRW-SRW link) and 
those who support descriptive increases without holding such a belief, a kind of support we 
refer to as ‘justice-plus’. Our key finding suggests that women were significantly more likely 
than men to both believe that an increase in DRW was necessary and that such an increase 
would enhance the representation of women’s political interests (SRW). In contrast, men 
were significantly more likely to support an increase in DRW but not relate DRW to SRW - 
the justice-plus rationale. 	
 
Why support an increase in the descriptive representation of women? 
There is a substantial theoretical literature that describes the likely, anticipated, or desired 
effects of having more women in political office (Pitkin 1973; Dahlerup 1988; Phillips 1995; 
Mansbridge 1999; Young 2001; Lovenduski 2005). For a long time, this literature was 
theoretical out of necessity thanks to the small numbers of women who were elected to 
legislatures worldwide. More recently, though, this theoretical literature has been 
supplemented by an empirical literature assessing what the impact of the welcome and 
overdue increase in the numbers of women in politics has actually been (Vega and Firestone 
1995; Childs 2004; Lovenduski & Norris 2003; Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; Murray 
2010; Allen et al. 2015).  
 
Across the literature, we can find two broad rationales for why someone might wish to 
support an increase in the number of women in politics.1 First, you might want to have more 
women in political office because you believe it will result in the better representation of 
women’s interests, subjectively defined, in the form of what you take to be preferable 
political outcomes for women. That is, you feel that there is a link between an increase in the 
DRW and the subsequent SRW. Second, you might support an increase in the DRW in 
political office because to do so is the just thing to do, regardless of what happens as a result, 
or because of other anticipated effects not related to the actual representation of women’s 
interests. These effects might include a kind of symbolic representation, or other unintended 
wider benefits of having more women in office. Anne Phillips neatly summarises this 
distinction, writing ‘I think that the issues we have addressed in recent years under the rubric 
of representation are not all, or not always, about that. They are often more about inclusion 
than representation, more about what it means to be recognized as a full member of one’s 
																																																						
1 To be clear, we assume throughout that such an increase is in pursuit of parity with the 
number of men holding political office. Although our arguments and findings may hold in a 
situation where women are a majority of political office-holders, we do not have the data to 
test our ideas in such a situation.	
society than how one can effect policy change’ (2012, p.517). We refer to these different 
positions as the substantive and justice-plus rationales and briefly summarise them below.2	
 
Writing about those who see a link between DRW and SRW, Celis et al. note that ‘the core 
assumption is that ‘numbers matter’: an increase in women’s descriptive representation in 
parliaments will generally—even automatically— translate into an increase in SRW’ (2008, 
p.99). This idea has informed a substantial body of feminist research into whether or not men 
and women differ in focus or behaviour once elected to political institutions (Thomas and 
Welch 1991; Swers 1998; Reingold 2000; Carroll 2001; Childs 2004). Contemporary 
accounts of this possible link between increased DRW and some kind of equivalent increase 
in SRW have problematized the notion of ‘women’s interests’ itself (Celis et al. 2008; Childs 
and Krook 2009; Celis and Childs 2012). In particular, Celis and Childs have noted that the 
previous approach of academics asking whether such a link between DRW and SRW existed 
consisted largely of ‘counting the number of women present in a particular political 
institution and judging the actions of women representatives against a ‘feminist’ shopping list 
of demands’ (2012, p.213). As such, the idea that ‘women’s interests’ exist in an objective 
sense has been brought into question, consequently complicating the link between DRW and 
SRW.  
 
For our purposes in this paper, though, such academic debates are not so relevant. The 
popular discourse that surrounds the activities of politicians suggests that the public 
themselves still strongly believe in a link between the characteristics held by a politician and 
how they are likely to act. Popular conceptions of the ‘political class’, for example, rely 
																																																						
2 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for the observation that these categories could 
apply to any group that is traditionally under-represented in politics, such as ethnic 
minorities, individuals with disabilities, and LGBT communities. 
heavily on the fact that politicians are not descriptively representative of the voters at large in 
terms of socio-economic class and that this results in some deficit of representation on 
economic issues (Hacker and Pierson 2011; Carnes 2013; Allen and Cairney 2015). 
Similarly, debates around issues that would be at the heart of any conception of a link 
between DRW and SRW, such as abortion, have at their core the notion that women will see 
these issues differently to men (Bicquelet et al. 2012; Penny 2015). In 2012, President Obama 
weighed in on comments made by an Indiana Senate candidate regarding abortion in cases of 
rape, saying ‘this is exactly why you don't want a bunch of politicians, mostly male, making 
decisions about women's health care decisions’.3 Given the nature of the popular debate on 
the issue, it stands to reason that the public might well have an intuitive folk belief in some 
kind of link between descriptive and substantive representation. 
 
The justice-plus rationale for increasing women’s descriptive representation starts from Anne 
Phillips’ famous argument from justice. She writes (1995, p.65): 
 
What we can more usefully do is turn the argument around, and ask by what ‘natural’ 
superiority of talent or experience men could claim a right to dominate assemblies? 
The burden of proof then shifts to the men, who would have to establish either some 
genetic distinction which makes them better at understanding problems and taking 
decisions, or some more socially derived advantage which enhances their political 
skills. Neither of these looks particularly persuasive; the first has never been 
successfully established, and the second is no justification if it depends on structures 
of discrimination. There is no argument from justice that can defend the current state 
																																																						
3  http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/24/obama-on-mourdock-male-politicians-
shouldnt-make-abortion-decisions/	
of affairs; and in this more negative sense, there is an argument from justice for parity 
between women and men. 
 
Crucially, Phillips’ argument is not reliant on what might come about as a result of their 
being more women in political office. It does not assume that such an increase will result in 
any particular policies or political outcomes that might benefit women. There are other 
arguments that equally do not rely on SRW of any kind to justify any increase in DRW. For 
example, Jane Mansbridge (1999) outlines the ways in which the increased descriptive 
representation of any social group that has traditionally been politically under-represented 
might result in various symbolic benefits for members of that group. These include an 
increased belief in their own ability to rule and participate in politics, as well as the increased 
legitimation of the political institution in question in the eyes of the traditionally under-
represented group. In other words, women are deemed likely to see a descriptive increase in 
women in politics as a sign that women as a group do have a role to play in decision-making 
political institutions, and to see the decisions emanating from those institutions as more 
legitimate as a result of women’s increased presence in them (Mansbridge 1999).  
 
Hypotheses 
Our interest in this paper is threefold. First, we look to establish overall levels of support for 
an increase in the descriptive representation of women in political legislatures, and to assess 
if this differs by sex. A number of studies and surveys of public opinion, predominantly from 
the United States, suggest that the majority of individuals not only want more women in 
legislatures (Dolan, 2014, Dolan and Sanbonmatsu, 2009; Sanbonmatsu, 2003; Simmons, 
2001), but that there is a significant difference by sex in terms of support for this idea (Cook, 
1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2003). Based on this we put forward the following hypothesis: 
 H1 - Women are more likely than men to believe that there ought to be more women in 
political legislatures. 
 
Second we examine whether, among those who do support a descriptive increase, the 
proportion of individuals holding the two broad positions discussed above differs by sex. Our 
initial focus is on those individuals who support the descriptive representation of women but 
don’t believe women better represent women than men – the justice-plus rationale. Our 
expectation is that such attitudes will be predominantly held by men. This might be for two 
main reasons. Firstly, men's interests are not as clearly defined as women's interests, either 
academically or pas a wider popular notion. Contrasting men’s interests to the debate around 
women’s interests, Rainbow Murray writes,  
 
‘the substantive representation of men attracts little public or scholarly attention. 
Because men are the dominant group, it is taken as a given that their interests will be 
understood and defended adequately by legislators. Men’s descriptive 
overrepresentation has triggered complacency concerning their substantive and 
symbolic representation. Men’s interests have not been subjected to the same intense 
scrutiny and debate and are less clearly defined. Yet, just as “women’s interests” are 
heterogeneous, men also have diverse, gender-specific interests that may not always 
be represented adequately by a male-dominated legislature’ (2014, p.528).  
 
Secondly, as the dominant political group, men themselves are perhaps less likely to have had 
cause to view politics in terms of their own substantive representation. Rather, they might 
instead view politics through the lens of a seemingly rationalized partisanship and ideology, 
thinking about politics as something that is not tied to their own personal gender identity or 
other characteristics (Sapiro, 1983). There is some evidence to support this contention, with 
Robert Johns et al. summarizing this literature as providing ‘indirect support for the notion 
that a social identity account of partisanship is likely to be more accurate for women’. (Johns 
et al., 2011, p.197). Based on this, we generate the following hypothesis: 
 
H2 – Those who believe that there ought to be more women elected to political 
legislatures but women are no better at representing women’s interests than men (a 
justice-plus rationale) are more likely to be men than women. 
 
Third, we examine the inverse of H2: whether, among those who do support a descriptive 
increase, are women more likely than men to hold the view that there is a link between DRW 
and SRW, or vice versa? As noted above, a plausible explanation might be that we are all 
intuitive believers in the link between descriptive and substantive representation based on our 
own lived experience, but men, as the dominant group in political institutions, have not had to 
reflect on their own substantive representation in the same way, or at the same rate, as 
women. As such, men might be oblivious to the fact that there might be such a link in this 
particular case. Women, on the other hand, women might be keenly aware of it – or at least 
keenly waiting in anticipation of it. It could equally be the case that women hold a belief in 
the link between DRW and SRW as a result of their past perceptions of male legislators’ 
behaviour. On this basis, we generate the following hypothesis; 
 
H3a – Amongst those who believe that there ought to be more women elected to 
political legislatures, women are more likely to hold the belief that women are better 
at representing women’s interests than men. 
 Alternatively, it also seems plausible that no-one has a default belief that members of a social 
group are better at representing the interests of that social group than anyone else. People 
might believe, for example, that they themselves are best represented by the content of a 
political ideology and that this ideology can in turn be represented by anyone regardless of 
their social characteristics. In such a case, we would expect no sex differences at all. As a 
result, our fourth and final hypothesis is as follows. 
 
H3b – Amongst those who believe that there ought to be more women elected to 
political legislatures, neither men nor women believe that women are better at 
representing women’s interests than men. 
 
Data and Methods 
We use individual-level data from the 2015 Northern Ireland Election survey to examine 
public attitudes to women’s representation. The dataset contains the individual responses of a 
representative sample of 1800 electors across eighteen Northern Irish parliamentary 
constituencies to a range of electoral, political and social questions asked within six weeks of 
the 2015 UK General Election. Northern Irish politics has seen a surge of interest in the 
representation of women in recent years, with interest peaking following the election of the 
first ever woman First Minister of Northern Ireland, Arlene Foster of the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), in January 2016. Her election came after a mixed 18 years following 
the Good Friday Agreement in which the inclusion of women in Northern Irish politics failed 
to meet the goals laid out in the Agreement itself. During that time, the numbers of women in 
the Northern Ireland Assembly never progressed beyond 20 per cent (Braniff and Whiting, 
2015).4 Additionally, in 2015 the Assembly and Executive Review Committee Report on 
Women in Politics and the Northern Ireland Assembly, set up to explore the question of 
women's involvement in Northern Irish politics as a whole, made a number of 
recommendations to political parties, including that they consider implementing measures 
designed to increase the numbers of women candidates they put forward (2015, p.2). Given 
this, the issue of women's representation was prominent at the time of the election.	
	
To address our hypotheses, we focus on individual responses to two statements asked in the 
2015 Northern Ireland General Election Survey. The first statement examines public support 
for an increase in the DRW in political institutions (H1): ‘There ought to be more women 
MPs and women elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly’. Through an analysis of 
responses to this statement, we model the profile of overall support for an increase in DRW 
and determine whether there is a sex effect after controlling for other predictor variables and 
established controls. We use this statement as the dependent variable - combining the 
strongly agree and agree categories - and specify a logistic regression model of support for an 
increase in DRW and report probabilities along with the conventional betas (log odds units) 
to aid interpretation of the results.5 	
 
																																																						
4 An interesting question is whether attitudes vary dependent on the number of women 
already in office. If cross-national data was available from a range of countries with sufficient 
variation in this regard, this could be tested using hierarchical models. Sadly, to the best of 
our knowledge no such data currently exists.	
5 We combine the two categories for simplicity. Our later model (multinomial logit) combines 
these categories out of necessity because of the small sample sizes in some of the categories 
so we felt that similar categorisations of the dependent variable should be used throughout the 
paper. However, for brevity, we have modelled the data using an ordinal scale and find no 
differences in the findings or in the significance of key variables. These results are available 
on request. 	
The second statement - ‘Women are better placed than men to represent women's interests in 
politics’ – addresses individual attitudes to SRW.6 First, in order to test H2, we examine those 
individuals who are supportive of an increase in DRW but do not feel that women are better 
than men at representing women (i.e. that there is a link between increased DRW and the 
quality of SRW). We examine individuals who hold this view first descriptively and then 
analytically. We use a binomial logistic regression analysis to not only profile their socio-
demographic and political attributes, but more importantly, determine whether men are more 
likely to advocate this justice-plus rationale than women, testing H2. 
 
To test hypotheses H3a and H3b we establish whether, among those who do support a 
descriptive increase, women are more likely than men to believe that women are better at 
representing women’s interests than men. Using these data, we can unpack individual support 
for the increased DRW and examine the relationship between this view and belief in a link 
between DRW and SRW. Further, we can compare individuals holding these views with 
those who support descriptive increases without believing that descriptive and substantive 
representation are linked in the case of women (justice-plus).  
 
Two other categories with relatively small sample sizes are also examined for completeness – 
those individuals who are anti- or indifferent to an increase in DRW and who do not link 
DRW and SRW, and those individuals who strongly agree or agree that women best represent 
women’s interests but don’t agree that there is any need to increase the numbers of women in 
political institutions.7 A somewhat larger sample of 403 individuals make-up the fifth 
																																																						
6 For both questions, individual responses are recorded on a Likert scale from 1-5 where 1 = 
Strongly agree and 5 = Strongly disagree.	
7 The anti/indifferent category contains 83 individuals who a) strongly disagreed or disagreed 
with both statements; b) strongly disagreed with one statement and was indifferent 
(responded neither agree nor disagree) with the other. The category containing those who feel 
category for those who expressed indifference (neither agree nor disagree) when responding 
to both statements.   
 
Following a descriptive analysis of the data, we use a multinomial regression analysis where 
individuals holding justice-plus attitudes are used as the reference category. From this we 
seek to establish whether women are more likely than men to believe that there should be an 
increase in DRW and that an increase in DRW results in better SRW (H3a), compared to those 
with justice-plus attitudes (i.e. there should be an increase in DRW, but this will not result in 
any change in SRW), or whether there is no difference in the distribution of these attitudes by 
sex (H3b).  
 
Both the logistic and multinomial models include conventional socio-demographic predictors 
and controls from the survey – sex, age, education, household status, class, working status 
and frequency of church attendance8 – as well as a number of political variables including 
left-right ideology, political identification and political interest.9 In the Northern Irish context, 
Unionism refers to a political ideology and culture that supports the continuation and 
preservation of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom whereas Nationalists seek an 
																																																																																																																																																																								
that women are better at representing women’s interests comprises 146 individuals who 
strongly agreed or agree with women better at representing women but strongly disagreed or 
disagreed with more women in political institutions. 	
8 Sex is a dichotomous variable (Reference = Male) as is Two or more children (Reference = 
None and one child) and Married/Living Together where all other categories are the base. We 
also include a dummy for church attendance at least once a month. Age is a categorical 
variable where Middle Age 30-44 is the base category, likewise education (Reference = No 
qualifications) and class (Reference = higher or salariat class) and employment status (set of 
dummies for not in work categories: retired, student, not working/unemployed, stay at home, 
other and missing employment) where the base category is in work (full time and part time 
employment). 	
9 Political identification is included to take account of whether individuals think themselves 
as Unionist (base category), Nationalist, Neither or Not Sure. Political Interest is a 
dichotomous variable where a lot and a great deal of interest =1 with all other categories zero. 
Left-Right is self-rated and runs on a scale from 0 = Far Left to 10 = Far Right. 	
end to this political union with the United Kingdom and advocate a ‘United Ireland’- the 
existence of one Ireland combining Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.10 We also 
include attitudinal variables such trust in politicians and whether women are discriminated 
against in public life.11  
Do women express greater support for an increase in the descriptive representation of 
women than men? 
Table 1 shows the results of two logistic regression models measuring support for the 
descriptive representation of women (those who strongly agree and agree with more women 
MPs and members of the Northern Ireland Assembly as opposed to those who do not). We 
run two separate logistic models: the first only includes the sex variable to determine whether 
there is an identifiable sex effect; the second is the full model containing sex and the 
predictors outlined above. In this model we determine whether any sex effect holds when 
other predictors are controlled for. For both models, we report the beta coefficients although 
the magnitudes of these in logistic models are difficult to interpret. To better assess the 
relative effect of these variables we convert the statistically significant coefficients into 
predicted probabilities using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003).12 These are also 
																																																						
10 Unionists are predominantly Protestants while Nationalists are overwhelmingly Roman 
Catholic. There is some overlap but generally this is the case. To avoid any correlation (in 
excess of 0.7 in our data), we include these political identification variables but not religion. 
However, as noted above we include church attendance to measure religious activity. 	
11 Trust in politicians is a dichotomous variable – where don’t trust politicians has a value of 
one and trust is the base category. The statement ‘there is discrimination against women in 
public life’ is on a Likert scale where 1 = Strongly disagree and 5 = Strongly agree. This is 
treated as a continuous variable and it is centered around the grand mean to ease 
interpretation of the parameter estimates. The models below include an interaction between 
women and discrimination against women in public life. Centering is applicable here because 
it reduces any correlation (which was 0.20 and well within acceptable bounds) between the 
multiplicative term and its component variables.	
12	We calculate the probability of supporting the descriptive representation of women when 
each significant predictor is varied from its minimum to maximum while simultaneously 
holding continuous predictor variables at their mean values and at zero for dummy variables 
formed from multiple category variables.	
shown in Table 1. Finally, we report a number of model fit statistics - Log Likelihood and 
Akaike Information Criterion – at different stages of the modelling process to assess the 
extent to which the model has improved following the introduction of additional predictors.  
 
Model 1 examines whether public support for an increase in the descriptive representation of 
women is greater among women than men. The evidence suggests that this is clearly the case, 
with women 2.9 times more likely to support an increase in DRW than men. The predicted 
probabilities also suggest that sex has a sizeable impact. To aid interpretation, we multiply 
the calculated probabilities by 100. The probability among women of supporting descriptive 
representation for women increases by twenty-four points.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
But does this sex effect hold when other predictors of descriptive representation are added to 
the model? The evidence presented in Table 2 suggests that it does, offering descriptive 
support for H1. Not only does the sex variable remain positive and significant but it still 
exerts a large effect despite the inclusion of additional variables – the probability of support 
among women for more women in political legislatures increases by seventeen points. Apart 
from evidence of a sex effect, those individuals that attend church once a month, have 
secondary level or below education qualifications, who are married, and in the 45-59 age 
range are all supportive of an increase in the descriptive representation of women. For those 
individuals that are not in work and stay at home – 97.6% of whom are women in this sample 
– the probability of supporting greater DRW increases by fifteen points. Conversely, those 
who identify politically as neither Unionist nor Nationalist are less likely to support increases 
in the descriptive representation for women. Individuals who lack interest in politics exhibit a 
similar response – among the politically uninterested the probability of support for more 
women in political legislatures lowers by eight points. Far and away the largest effect on 
support for an increase in DRW comes from holding the belief that women are discriminated 
against in public life. Among those who agree that women are discriminated against, the 
probability of supporting greater DRW increases by sixty points. But women who agreed that 
women are discriminated against in public life – which we measure using an interaction 
effect - were not significantly more likely to be supportive of an increase in DRW than men 
who felt the same way. 
 
Are women who support an increase in DRW more likely to also believe in a link 
between DRW and SRW than men? 
To examine whether women are more likely than men to hold the view that there is a link 
between DRW and SRW, and descriptively test H3a, it is necessary to take account of a 
number of different attitudinal profiles. As stated earlier, we placed individuals into five 
categories – unsure, anti- and indifferent, supportive of substantive representation but not 
DRW, and the two rationales of most interest to us, justice-plus and those who both support 
an increase in descriptive representation of women and believe in a link between DRW and 
SRW. Table 2 compares the socio-economic and political profile of these five groups versus 
the wider population. Those individuals who are supportive of a descriptive increase and 
believe that increased DRW results in better SRW tend overwhelmingly to be female, 
working class, have educational qualifications to only the secondary level or below, are those 
who stay at home, are married and/or live together, and are in part time work. They are more 
likely to be Nationalists and have lower levels of political interest than average. By contrast, 
individuals who express the justice-plus rationale seem to have two distinct socio-economic 
profiles. Above all they are more likely to male and married and/or living together with their 
partner. Additionally, membership of this group is also higher among both young people aged 
18-29 and those from the 45-59 age category. A similarly unclear pattern exists for education, 
class, and working status. Those who advocate a justice-plus rationale tend to be over-
represented among both those with degrees and no qualifications, the higher or salariat class, 
the working class, those in full-time employment, and those who stay at home. Their political 
profile, however, is far clearer. They are more likely to be Unionists and slightly more 
politically interested than average. Descriptively, this evidence offers initial support for H2 
and H3a 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
The remaining three groups are of less interest in terms of the focus of the paper but 
nonetheless exhibit distinctive socio-demographic and political profiles. As might be 
expected, those who express anti- or indifferent feelings to both the descriptive and 
substantive representation of women tend to be over-represented among males, those aged 65 
and over, retired individuals, those with no qualifications, those who attend church once a 
month, not working or unemployed (and also in full-time employment), and the working 
class. We should be wary of the low sample size, but it is clear that these people are more 
likely to be Unionists and have higher than average distrust of politicians. Like the anti- and 
indifferent group, those who are unsure also tend to be male, from older age groups and in 
full time employment. However, this group is over-represented among the middle classes and 
those with post-secondary qualifications. They tend to be politically interested but are more 
likely to be Unionist or Nationalist than the wider population. Our data suggests that those 
individuals who agree that women better represent women’s interests but do not support the 
statement that there ought to be an increase in DRW also has a unique socio-demographic 
profile. Interestingly, people holding these attitudes tend to be female, in full-time work, 
middle aged, middle class and highly educated. There is also some over-representation 
among those who are not working or unemployed, while those that hold this view are more 
likely to be Nationalist or neither Nationalist nor Unionist and exhibit slightly higher levels of 
political interest than the wider population.  
 
In summary, individual responses to the two survey statements concerning descriptive and 
substantive representation can be categorised into five distinct types. Individual members of 
these categories displayed distinctive socio-economic and political profiles. The descriptive 
evidence suggests that women rather than men are more likely to hold the view that there is a 
link between DRW and SRW, offering initial support for H3a and allowing us to reject H3b. 
Among those advocating the justice-plus rationale, the split is more even between men and 
women with the former tending to be more over-represented of the two sexes. But is the 
descriptive evidence of a sex difference borne out when we take account of other predictors? 
 
Modelling justice-plus and substantive rationales 
Building on the descriptive evidence presented above, we proceed by specifying a series of 
multivariate models to more rigorously address our remaining hypotheses (H2, H3a and H3b). 
Initially, we run a binomial logistic regression to contrast those holding justice-plus rationales 
against all other categories. Model A of Table 3 reports the results of this logistic regression. 
Model B contrasts those who support an increase in DRW and the view that DRW improves 
SRW with those who are unsure, anti-, and indifferent, and those who are supportive of the 
idea that DRW and DRW are linked without agreeing that DRW ought to be increased 
against those holding the justice-plus rationale using a multinomial logistic regression 
model.13  
 
Looking first at the comparison of those individuals who expressed support for the justice-
plus rationale against all other individual attitudes combined (first column in Table 3, Model 
A), the results indicate that, as expected, men are significantly more likely to support this 
position than women (H2). Indeed, being a woman lowers the likelihood of supporting the 
justice-plus rationale as opposed to alternative attitudes by three points. Apart from evidence 
of a sex effect, women who agree that women are discriminated in public life are 
significantly less likely to support descriptive representation for women in isolation – for this 
group, the probability of advocating a justice-plus rationale reduces by twelve points.  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Turning to examine support for the remaining attitudinal positions compared against the 
justice-plus rationale (the other three columns in Table 3) leads to clear conclusions that 
directly address our key hypothesis (H3a and H3b). Relative to other attitudinal positions, 
amongst those who believe that there ought to be more women elected to political 
legislatures, women are significantly more likely to hold the belief that women are better at 
representing women’s interests than men. This finding provides unequivocal support for 
hypothesis (H3a). Indeed, being a woman increases the probability of supporting this 
consequentialist position by a sizeable 21 points (see Figure 1). Individuals who agree that 
women are discriminated in public life are also significantly more likely hold a belief in the 
																																																						
13 Here we test for Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) using both the Hausman and 
Small-Hsiao test – none of the tests reject the H0 that IIA holds. These findings suggest that a 
multinomial regression is an appropriate model to address the hypotheses outlined above.  
	
link between descriptive and substantive representation – the probability increases by 60 
points and has by far the biggest impact of any variable we include.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
When compared against the justice-plus rationale, those who see a link between increased 
DRW and better SRW were significantly more likely to either have secondary or post-
secondary qualifications as opposed to no educational qualifications. They were also found to 
have an increased likelihood of self-identifying as a Nationalist in the Northern Irish context. 
But even when controlling for all these predictors, there is clear evidence of a sex effect. 
Turning to the other attitudinal positions, when compared with the justice-plus rationale, 
there is no evidence of a difference by sex and in all three cases individuals are significantly 
less likely to agree that women are discriminated in public life. Among those who are anti- 
and indifferent, there is some suggestion that this view is not shared by women (as illustrated 
by the positive coefficient), but given the small sample size we should be wary of overstating 
the implications of this finding. 	
 
Conclusion 
This paper has offered the first attempt in the literature to date to unpack the rationales that 
might be behind individual-level support for the idea that there ought to be more women 
present in political institutions. We began by outlining two distinct rationales that might be 
held regarding any increase in the numbers of women in political institutions – the 
substantive position that sees an increase in DRW as important in bringing about a 
subsequent improvement in SRW, or the justice-plus position that sees an increase in DRW 
as important for reasons of justice or other symbolic benefits. Exploring four key hypotheses, 
we descriptively found that women are more likely than men to support an increase in DRW, 
providing evidence for H1. Moving to multivariate analyses, we found that women were more 
likely to hold both the view that an increase in DRW was desirable and that such an increase 
would improve the representation of women’s political interests (SRW). Conversely, men 
were found to be more likely to support an increase in DRW but not relate DRW to SRW in 
any way – the justice-plus rationale. This offers support for H2 and H3a, respectively, and no 
support for H3b which posited that there might be no sex difference in the distribution of these 
different attitudes.  
 
Our findings have clear implications for those engaged in trying to increase the numbers of 
women in political institutions. The evidence we present in this paper suggests that men and 
women think about the under-representation of women in distinct ways. When women agree 
that there ought to be greater DRW in politics, we can infer that they do so in additional 
anticipation of the subsequent positive impact this will have on SRW. In other words, women 
seem to want more women in politics to some extent because they will represent women’s 
interests better than men. On the other hand, men appear to support increases in DRW for 
reasons unrelated to SRW, reasons we collectively refer to as the justice-plus rationale. There 
is clear room for future research into the underpinnings of men and women’s attitudes 
towards issues of gender (in)equality and how these should be resolved (Lovenduski 2012). 
Such research should inform those involved in the practicalities of convincing voters that the 
under-representation of women is something that deserves their attention. 
 
Finally, our results raise normative questions regarding the treatment of those women who do 
make it into elected political office. If women value an increase in the DRW based on the 
anticipated benefits this will bring in terms of improved SRW, does this mean that these new 
women legislators, or prospective women candidates, are being assessed on an extra criterion 
that their male colleagues are not? As Joni Lovenduski writes, ‘the representation of women 
in political decision making is vital not because it will necessarily make a difference for 
women, though it often does, but because justice demands it. Equal representation should be 
taken for granted, part of the institutional fabric. Women should not have to claim political 
presence on any other basis than justice. To do so puts a special burden of representation on 
women MPs who become subject to scrutiny and pressure that male politicians largely avoid’ 
(2012, p.699). As of yet, it would appear that the public remain to be persuaded on this point. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Logistic Regression Model of Public Support for Descriptive Representation 
 
Variables  Model 1: Descriptive 
Representation 
     β        SE      Probabilities 
Model 2: Descriptive 
Representation 
   β        SE      Probabilities 
Constant   0.09     0.07          - -0.51    0.28              - 
Sex   
Female   1.08*   0.10        0.24  0.77*  0.11            0.17 
Household Status   
Married/LT   0.37*  0.13            0.08 
Children   
Two or More  -0.01    0.16              - 
Age   
Young Age 18-29  -0.15    0.19              - 
Mid/Older Age 45-59   0.49*  0.16            0.10 
Old Age 60 plus   0.38    0.24              - 
Missing Age   0.14    0.29              - 
Education   
Degree   0.48    0.26              -  
Post-Secondary   0.30    0.19              - 
Secondary and Below   0.51*  0.17            0.11 
Missing Education   0.10    0.35              - 
Class    
Middle Class   0.12    0.18              - 
Working Class   0.37    0.20              - 
Missing Class   0.02    0.24              - 
Attend Church    
At least Once a Month   0.25*  0.12            0.05 
Employment   
Not Working/Unemployed  -0.23    0.19              - 
Retired  -0.16    0.24              - 
Long Term Ill  -0.12    0.30              - 
Student   0.68    0.37              - 
Stay at Home   0.78*  0.25            0.15 
Other Employment   0.04    0.50              - 
Missing Employment  -0.19    0.36              - 
Political   
Nationalist   0.23    0.17              - 
Neither  -0.45*  0.15           -0.10 
Not Sure Either  -0.35    0.22              - 
Interest in Politics   
A lot + Great Deal  -0.34*  0.16           -0.08 
Trust Politicians   
Don’t Trust Politicians  -0.55    0.35              - 
Self-Rated Ideology   
Left-Right   0.06    0.04              - 
Discrimination   
Women in Public Life   0.76*   0.10        0.60 
Female*Women in Pub Life  -0.14    0.13          - 
Model Fit   
LR Chi-Square  110.70* 259.22* 
Log Likelihood -1108.95 -991.47 
AIC 2221.90 2044.94 
N 1800 1800 
*Significant <0.05. Additional model fit statistics – Model 1: McFadden’s R2 = 0.05. Model 
2: McFadden’s R2 = 0.15.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Socio-Economic and Political Profile of Attitudes to the Representation and 
Women in Politics 
 
Socio-Economic 
Profile  
Anti & 
Indifferent 
% 
Justice-
Plus 
% 
Substantive 
 
 % 
No Justice + &  
Yes 
Substantive 
% 
Unsure  
% 
Overall 
Sample  
% 
Sex       
Female 32.5 48.2 64.4 58.9 33.7 52.4 
Male 67.5 51.8 35.6 41.1 66.3 47.6 
Household Status       
Married/Living 
Together 
56.6 64.5 63.2 54.8 51.4 59.7 
Children       
No Children 65.1 60.9 61.5 60.3 69.2 63.2 
One Child 16.8 14.7 16.5 13.0 15.9 15.8 
Two or More 18.1 24.4 22.0 26.7 14.9 21.0 
Age       
Young Age 18-29 9.6 17.8 14.9 13.7 19.4 15.9 
Middle Age 30-44 26.5 30.5 29.1 34.9 29.3 29.7 
Mid/Older Age 45-59 19.3 27.4 26.3 26.0 19.1 24.4 
Old Age 60 plus 39.8 20.3 24.0 22.6 25.3 24.5 
Missing Age 4.8 4.1 5.7 2.7 6.9 5.5 
Education       
Degree 8.4 17.3 10.5 19.2 9.4 11.6 
Post-Secondary 24.1 29.4 34.0 24.7 38.5 33.3 
Secondary and Below 24.1 26.4 33.2 28.1 22.6 29.2 
No Qualifications 38.6 24.9 18.8 24.7 23.3 21.9 
Missing Education 4.8 2.0 3.5 3.4 6.2 4.0 
Social Class       
Higher Class/Prof 8.5 20.3 16.2 24.6 17.4 17.2 
Middle Class 31.3 28.9 31.0 37.0 35.0 32.2 
Working Class 36.1 33.5 33.6 23.3 24.8 30.9 
Attend Church       
At least Once a Month 44.6 38.6 40.7 32.9 28.0 37.2 
Employment       
Full Time Work 41.0 42.1 31.8 45.2 41.2 36.6 
Part Time Work 4.8 11.2 13.7 4.8 7.2 10.8 
Not Working/Unemp 12.0 8.6 9.1 15.8 11.7 10.3 
Retired 22.9 14.7 19.1 21.2 20.3 19.2 
Long Term Ill 8.4 3.6 2.6 0.7 4.2 3.2 
Student 1.2 4.1 3.7 2.1 3.5 3.4 
Stay at Home 3.6 14.2 15.8 4.8 4.2 11.6 
Other Employment 1.2 0 1.3 1.4 0.7 1.1 
Missing Employment 4.8 1.5 3.0 4.1 6.9 3.9 
Political       
Unionist 44.6 49.2 31.7 28.1 33.0 34.2 
Nationalist 32.5 16.8 31.5 31.5 14.9 26.2 
Neither 20.5 22.8 31.1 40.4 39.5 32.3 
Not Sure Either 2.4 11.2 5.7 0 12.7 7.2 
Interest in Politics       
A lot + Great Deal 32.5 16.8 13.3 16.4 16.9 15.6 
Trust Politicians       
Don’t Trust Politicians 12.0 3.0 2.3 3.4 2.7 3.0 
N 83 197	 971 146 403 1800	
*Note – In some cases, percentages do not total 100% because of missing categories (Missing 
class – 24.1% Anti/Indifferent; 17.3% Justice +; 19.2% Justice + & Substantive; 15.1% No 
Justice + & Yes Substantive; 22.8% Unsure; 19.7% Overall). **For each attitudinal question, 
Strongly Agree and Agree have been combined (given a value of 1) with all others responses 
given a value of zero.  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Binomial (Model A) and multinomial logit (Model B) models of attitudinal 
positions towards the representation of women in politics 
Variables  Model A 
Justice  
Plus 
 β        SE 
Model B 
Anti/ 
Indifferent 
   β        SE 
Model B 
Unsure 
 
   β        SE 
Model B 
No J+ Yes 
Substantive 
   β        SE 
Model B 
Yes J+ Yes 
Substantive 
β        SE 
Constant -1.50*  0.42 -1.93*  0.77  0.90*  0.45 -0.06    0.57  0.27    0.42 
Sex      
Female -0.36*  0.17  0.21    0.37 -0.32    0.20  0.12    0.25  0.73*  0.18 
Household Status      
Married/LT  0.23    0.20 -0.40    0.32 -0.44*  0.21 -0.47    0.26 -0.08    0.19 
Children      
Two or More  0.17    0.21 -0.05    0.40 -0.33    0.25  0.25    0.30 -0.17    0.22 
Age      
Young Age 18-29  0.36    0.28 -0.82    0.55 -0.28    0.31 -0.71    0.39 -0.34    0.28 
Mid/Older Age 45-59  0.05    0.22 -0.42    0.42 -0.44    0.26 -0.17    0.31  0.16    0.23 
Old Age 60 plus -0.32    0.31  0.50    0.55 -0.01    0.40 -0.51    0.53  0.46    0.36 
Missing Age -0.24    0.41  0.14    0.72  0.25    0.47 -0.65    0.69  0.28    0.43 
Education      
Degree  0.45    0.34 -0.83    0.65 -0.67    0.41 -0.58    0.47 -0.23    0.36 
Post-Secondary -0.38    0.25 -0.19    0.46  0.42    0.30 -0.36    0.39  0.58*  0.27 
Secondary and Below -0.40    0.24 -0.06    0.42  0.10    0.29 -0.05    0.35  0.67*  0.26 
Missing Education -0.36    0.71  0.09    0.27  0.39    0.67 -0.09    0.86  0.41    0.64 
Class          
Middle Class  0.09    0.27  0.47    0.55 -0.08    0.30 -0.22    0.36  0.06    0.28 
Working Class  0.32    0.29  0.47    0.58 -0.48    0.33 -1.01*  0.41 -0.19    0.30 
Missing Class  0.04    0.35  1.18    0.66 -0.08    0.41 -0.71    0.51 -0.12    0.37 
Attend Church          
At least Once a Month  0.19    0.18 -0.02    0.32 -0.40    0.21 -0.41    0.26 -0.12    0.18 
Employment      
Not Working/Unemployed -0.30    0.32  0.19    0.53  0.34    0.35  0.78    0.40  0.27    0.32 
Retired -0.34    0.31 -0.27    0.55  0.50    0.41  1.04*  0.52  0.42    0.37 
Long Term Ill  0.05    0.48  0.06    0.68  0.21    0.51  0.06    0.68 -0.05    0.48 
Student  0.11    0.51 -1.20    1.27 -0.52    0.62 -0.04    0.87  0.29    0.56 
Stay at Home  0.35    0.26 -1.22    0.73 -0.85*  0.38 -0.76    0.51 -0.11    0.29 
Other Employment -  0.14    0.13  0.14    0.13  0.16    0.13  0.15    0.13 
Missing Employment -1.11    0.83  0.63    1.01  1.08    0.74  1.79    0.90  1.22    0.73 
Political      
Nationalist -1.14*  0.23  1.01*  0.40  0.45    0.28  1.48*  0.34  1.33*  0.25 
Neither -0.93*  0.21  0.48    0.40  1.10*  0.23  1.33*  0.30  0.83*  0.21 
Not Sure Either  0.13    0.28 -1.24    0.80  0.50    0.32 -0.15    0.57 -0.28    0.30 
Interest in Politics      
A lot + Great Deal -0.03    0.22  0.80*  0.34  0.12    0.25  0.01    0.52 -0.19    0.23 
Trust Politicians      
Don’t Trust Politicians  0.22    0.44  1.50*  0.58 -0.30    0.53 -0.11    0.63 -0.58    0.49 
Self-Rated Ideology      
Left-Right -0.03    0.05 -0.04    0.09 -0.02    0.06  0.06    0.07  0.07    0.05 
Discrimination      
Women in Public Life  0.07    0.12 -1.18*  0.22 -0.31*  0.15 -0.50*  0.19  0.40*  0.15 
Female*Women in Pub Life -0.32*  0.16  0.74*  0.33  0.07    0.21  0.34    0.27  0.05    0.19 
Model Fit      
LR Chi-Square  83.50* 650.22* 650.22* 650.22* 650.22* 
Log Likelihood -583.08 -1935.29 -1935.29 -1935.29 -1935.29 
AIC 1226.16 4118.56 4118.56	 4118.56	 4118.56	
N 1800 1800 1800 1800 1800 
*Significant <0.05. *Note: Justice-plus is the base category for Model B.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Effects of significant predictors on the probability of supporting an increase in 
DRW and also believing that increased DRW leads to better SRW	
 
 
*Predicted probabilities derived from Table 3 where the justice-plus rationale is the base 
category.  
 
 
	
 
 
	
